Incarceration and the Economic Fortunes of Urban Neighborhoods by Fagan, Jeffrey & West, Valerie
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2011 
Incarceration and the Economic Fortunes of Urban 
Neighborhoods 
Jeffrey Fagan 
Columbia Law School, jfagan@law.columbia.edu 
Valerie West 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, WEST@MAIL.SOC.NYU.EDU 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, Incarceration and the Economic Fortunes of Urban Neighborhoods, 
ECONOMICS AND YOUTH VIOLENCE: CRIME, DISADVANTAGE, AND COMMUNITY, RICHARD ROSENFELD, MARK EDBERG, 
XIANGMING FANG, & CURTIS S. FLORENCE, EDS., NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2013; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW 
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 11-266 (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1682 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1772190
Columbia Law School 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group 
 
 





Incarceration and the Economic Fortunes of Urban Neighborhoods 
 
Jeffrey Fagan 



















INCARCERATION AND THE ECONOMIC FORTUNES  
















435 West 116th Street 







                                                  
§ This research was supported by Grant 85-00-11 from the Russell Sage Foundation, Future of Work 
Program. All opinions are solely those of the authors, as are any errors. Additional support was provided by 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Substance Abuse Policy Research Program. We are grateful to the 
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, the New York State Department of Labor, New 
York City Police Department, and the New York City Department of Health for generously supplying data 
for this research. Tamara Dumanovsky helped conceptualize and launch the project, and supervised the 
assembly of the datasets.  Jan Holland prepared the maps and supervised the geocoding of incarceration and 
arrest records.  Steven Glickman, Nicole Mutter, and Carolyn Pinedo provided excellent research 
assistance. 
*   Professor of Law and Public Health, Columbia University; Visiting Professor, Yale Law School 
**  Assistant Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1772190
ABSTRACT 
 
New research has identified the consequences of high rates of incarceration on 
neighborhood crime rates, but few studies have looked beyond crime to examine the 
collateral effects of incarceration on the social and economic well being of the 
neighborhoods themselves and their residents.  We assess two specific indicia of 
neighborhood economic well-being, household income and human capital, dimensions 
that are robust predictors of elevated crime, enforcement and incarceration rates. We 
decompose incarceration effects by neighborhood racial composition and socio-
economic conditions to account for structural disadvantages in labor force and access to 
wealth that flow from persistent patterns of residential segregation. We use panel 
methods to examine the effects on incarceration on New York City census tracts over an 
11 year period from 1985-1996, a period which saw crime rates rise and fall sharply, 
and when incarceration rates increased and remained high in concentrated areas 
throughout the city.  We examine whether persistently high incarceration rates erode 
human capital and depress median household incomes, further intensifying incarceration 
risks and threatening to create conditions where incarceration and economic 
disadvantage become endogenous features of certain neighborhoods.  We find distinct 
but overlapping effects for prisons and jails, suggesting that these are parallel processes 
produced by loosely coupled law enforcement priorities. Incarceration effects are greater 
for household income than human capital, suggesting a complex relationship between 
persistent poverty, residential segregation, and incarceration that reinforces a classic 
poverty trap. Household incomes are lower over time in neighborhoods with higher 
proportions of African American population, even after controlling for the effects of race 
on incarceration, but we find no similar effects for Hispanic populations. Spatially 
targeted policies such as microinvestment and housing development may be needed offset 
the local embeddedness of poverty and disrupt its connections to incarceration and 
crime, while education policy and transitional labor market networking can strengthen 
local human capital. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Research on the growth in incarceration has focused both on the sources of 
incarceration and its public safety returns.  The incapacitative and deterrent effects of 
incarceration are fundamental rationales for the heavy fiscal burdens of mass 
incarceration, and legislators have used a wide range of policy instruments to increase the 
number of persons sentenced to prison and the lengths of their sentences.   Recent studies 
disagree on the impacts of incarceration on crime rates within states (see, for example, 
Spelman, 2000; Zimring, Hawkins and Kamin, 2003; Levitt, 2003; Katz, Levitt, and 
Shustorovich, 2003) or smaller areas within cities (Clear, Rose, Waring and Scully, 2003; 
Lynch and Sabol, 2003; Fagan, West and Holland, 2003). 
 While this debate continues, a parallel line of research has started to examine the 
impacts of the rise in incarceration both on inmates and the family members they left 
behind and to whom they return (Nagin, Cullen and Johnson, 2009; Durlauf and Nagin, 
2010).  Recent studies have examined the intergenerational impacts of incarceration on 
the economic and social well being of children and families (Geller, Garfinkel and 
Western, 2012; Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999; LeBlanc, 2003).  Other research has 
examined the challenges facing newly released inmates to avoid crime and successfully 
return to community life (Visher and Travis, 2002; Travis, 2005; Petersilia, 2004).   Their 
re-entry is complicated by the specific effects of incarceration on work (Western 2006; 
Pettit and Western, 2004) and crime (Chen and Shapiro, 2007).  For example, 
incarceration suppresses future earnings, especially for young African American males, 
whether by diminishing their human capital that makes them marketable in the workplace 
(e.g., Freeman, 1992; Pettit and Lyons, 2003), or by attaching a stigma that discourages 
employers from hiring them even for low-paying unskilled labor jobs (Pager, 2003).  
Incarceration increases – or  perhaps coerces -- residential mobility, contributing to social 
instability and detachment from supportive social networks that in turn increases crime 
(Clear et al., 2003).  Incarceration often is a turning point that diminishes the life 
prospects for stable marriage and employment (e.g., Sampson and Laub, 1993; Laub and 
Sampson, 2003: 290-92).   Incarceration also excludes returning inmates from several 
forms of political participation and citizenship: jury service, the right to vote, and the 
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right to hold elective office (Fletcher, 1999; Maurer, 2000; Miles, 2004).  The racial 
concentration of incarceration means that these effects are especially pronounced for 
African Americans (Maurer, 2000; Fagan, 2004, 2008).1 
 These studies illustrate that the consequences of incarceration extend beyond 
individual effects to change the social organization and economic fortunes of 
neighborhoods.  Incarceration is spatially concentrated, a consequence of the spatial 
clustering of crime, law enforcement, social structural risk, and racial residential 
segregation (Morenoff  et al., 1997; Fagan et al., 2010; Fagan and Davies, 2004; 
Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).2  A handful of studies have illustrated this spatial 
concentration of incarceration, and examined whether this spatial concentration reduces 
or contributes to crime (c.f., Clear et al., 2003; Fagan, West and Holland, 2003; Lynch 
and Sabol, 2004).    
 These studies examined the reciprocal effects of crime, incarceration and 
neighborhood social and economic disadvantage that are bound together in complex 
neighborhood ecological dynamics.  These neighborhood dynamics themselves exert 
secondary or one-off effects on a range of individual outcomes including crime, 
employment, school dropout, teenage pregnancy and drug abuse, often swamping any 
individual effects (Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley, 2002; Sampson, Morenoff, 
and Raudenbush, 2005).  In some neighborhoods, this racial-spatial concentration may 
accumulate to produce collective consequences for entire neighborhoods whose effects 
are well beyond what we might expect from the aggregation of individual effects of 
persons within neighborhoods.  
Several researchers now are examining the effects of this spatial concentration of 
incarceration, including its effects on social and economic indicia of community life.  
Recent theoretical and empirical work has focused on the unintended consequences of 
                                                  
1 Disenfranchisement disproportionately and severely affects African American males, consistent with their 
distorted presence in the incarceration population: of the 3.9 million American felons who are 
disenfranchised in 1999, nearly 1.4 were African American males, representing 13% of all black males 
(Maurer, 2000). 
2 For example, neighborhood disadvantage may invite closer surveillance by law enforcement, well in 
excess of levels of surveillance and enforcement that would be predicted by crime rates alone (Fagan and 
Davies, 2000, 2002), increasing incarceration risks relative to crime rates.  These reciprocal patterns of 
crime, enforcement and social risk sustain the elevated rates of incarceration, and appear to do so even 
when crime rates decline (Fagan et al., 2003).  
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incarceration not just for individuals or families, but for neighborhoods that experience 
the highest rates of incarceration (Lynch and Sabol, 2004).  Much of this work has 
focused on the possibility that incarceration may increase neighborhood crime rates 
(Clear et al., 2003; Fagan et al., 2003; Lynch et al., 2001; Lynch and Sabol, 2004).  Few 
(Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999; Sabol and Lynch, 2003) have looked at the effects of 
incarceration on the social and economic contexts – human capital, poverty, family and 
child well-being -- of neighborhoods that are intricately bound up with incarceration and 
crime (see, Crutchfield, this volume).  Because crime, incarceration and neighborhood 
contexts are part of a complex ecological dynamic with reciprocal effects over time, 
unraveling these influences is a potentially important step in understanding the persistent 
spatial concentration of incarceration that seems to be orthogonal to local crime rates. 3 
In this article, we take another step in this direction.  We analyze data from a 
panel study of New York City neighborhoods to examine the effects of incarceration on 
two indicia of the economic well-being of neighborhoods: median household income and 
human capital.  The research setting is New York City in the years from 1985-1996, a 
period when there was a “perfect storm” of crime crises and their sequellae: epidemics of 
gun violence and highly addictive drugs (Fagan, Wilkinson and Davies, 2007), economic 
instability (Mollenkopf, 1995), a significant increase in incarceration per crime (Fagan, 
West and Holland, 2003), and high rates of residential mobility (DeGiovanni and 
Minnete, 1992; Beveridge, 2008).  These dynamics disproportionately affected the City’s 
minority citizens (Community Service Society, 2004).  In our earlier study in 2003, we 
showed that incarceration grew over time after controlling for the crime rate and for law 
enforcement.  The stability of incarceration in the face of declining crime rates illustrated 
the endogeneity of incarceration in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods.  But 
neighborhood economic strength was one of the factors that protectively insulated 
neighborhoods from the spiraling crime-incarceration dynamic. 
Accordingly, we examine here whether in fact the dynamics of incarceration 
adversely affect the social and economic resources of the City’s neighborhoods, and 
embed neighborhoods in the endogenous dynamics of crime, incarceration and 
                                                  
3 See, for example, Fagan, West and Holland, 2005, showing the persistence of incarceration rates over 
time that are independent of local crime rates, even after accounting for the endogeneity of crime, 
incarceration and social structural disadvantage in New York City neighborhoods. 
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disadvantage.  We examine whether incarceration exhibits negative effects on 
neighborhood well-being using two dimensions of neighborhood economic status, 
median income and human capital.  Both are robust predictors of elevated crime, 
enforcement and incarceration rates.  We use a panel design to examine the effects on 
incarceration on New York City census tracts over an 11 year period from 1985-1996, a 
period which saw crime rates rise and then fall (Karmen, 2000; Fagan, Zimring and Kim, 
1998; Bowling, 1999; Zimring, 2006), but an era when incarceration rates rose steadily in 
concentrated areas throughout the city. We ask whether persistently high incarceration 
rates erode human capital and depress incomes, intensifying incarceration risks and 
threatening to create conditions where incarceration and economic disadvantage are 
endogenous features of certain neighborhoods. 
 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 Neighborhoods exert strong effects on a wide range of social behaviors (for a 
review, see Sampson et al., 2002), including crime (Fagan, 2008).  These effects 
influence the social and economic behaviors not only of their residents, but also residents 
of the surrounding areas through dynamics of diffusion or contagion of neighborhood 
effects (Reordan et al., 2008; Reordan and Sullivan, 2004; Grannis, 1998).   
Neighborhood effects capture the intricate interplay between social structure, social 
organization, and social control that combine to influence individual behaviors.  Interest 
in neighborhood effects has produced new research on small area variations in child 
development and child maltreatment, domestic violence, teenage sexual behavior and 
childbearing, school dropout, home ownership, several indicia of health, suicide, 
disorder, drug use and adolescent delinquency (see, for example, Coulton, Korbin and 
Chow, 1995; Miles-Doan, 1998; Crane, 1991; Gould et al., 1990a, 1990b; Brooks-Gunn 
et al., 1993; Rowe and Rogers, 1994).  Moreover, evidence of the spread of social 
behaviors from one neighborhood to the next suggests that element of social contagion 
may also explain variation in crime rates over time (Fagan and Davies, 2004). 
Here, we focus not on the neighborhood effects on individuals, but instead on the 
effects of incarceration on the ecology of neighborhoods and their developmental 
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trajectories over time.  We assume that neighborhoods (like people) are dynamic entities 
that change over time, and that these transformations are likely to lead to complex 
outcomes of crime and other indicia of social and economic life.   
A small number of studies use panel methods to examine these interactions within 
neighborhoods over time, identifying complex interactions and (non-recursive) feedback 
processes between crime and the social dynamics and compositional characteristics of 
neighborhoods (c.f., Bellair, 2000).4  Some neighborhood change studies have examined 
the reciprocal influence of adjacent neighborhoods on crime rates.  For example, Taylor 
and Covington (1988), Morenoff and Sampson (1997), and Heitgerd and Bursik (1987) 
all identified dynamics where crime or violence in one area influenced homicide rates in 
adjacent areas over time.  Taylor and Covington examined gentrification as a trigger for 
crime, while Heitgard and Bursik used a similar strategy to show that show that even 
stable, well-organized communities can have high rates of delinquency when the adjacent 
neighborhoods experienced rapid racial change.  Other studies have identified turning 
points in neighborhoods that precede the onset or intensification of crime. Bursik and 
colleagues (Bursik and Webb, 1982; Bursik, 1984; Bursik and Grasmick, 1992, 1993) 
analyzed neighborhood change in Chicago’s 74 planning areas to identify turning points 
in the natural history of neighborhood development to pinpoint when crime rates change 
and grow. 
In this article, we are concerned with the effects both of endogenous social 
dynamics – including crime, economic activity, and stratification – and exogenous shocks 
to these systems through public policy choices.  The fact that incarceration has elements 
of both – endogeneity with crime, exogeneity with policy choices – is both a conceptual 
and analytic challenge. That is, the specific question is how incarceration, which is both a 
response to crime within neighborhoods but also a public policy choice produced by 
factors exogenous to the neighborhoods, affects the developmental history of 
neighborhood economics.  If the affects are salutary, then we might conclude that 
incarceration produces the ancillary benefits of promoting neighborhood resilience to 
                                                  
4 Physical and social deterioration is a persistent theme of neighborhood change in several studies (Taub, 
Taylor and Dunham, 1984; Schuerman and Kobrin, 1986; Harrell and Gouvis, 1994).  Deterioration often 
cued citizens to leave previously stable areas based on changes in their subjective evaluation of the 
likelihood of crime affecting them personally.  
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crime while at the same time reducing one of the main sociological culprits in local crime 
rates.  But we might also worry that if incarceration adversely affects neighborhoods, the 
criminal justice policies producing incarceration may actually worsen and reify the social 
and economic risks of crime and other social behaviors, creating an internal equilibrium 
that will sustain incarceration over time and resist incremental policy changes meant to 
disrupt it. 
 
Incarceration and Neighborhood Crime 
Three studies have shown that the risks of going to jail or prison grow over time 
for persons living in poor neighborhoods.  In a panel study of New York City 
neighborhoods from 1985-96, Fagan et al. (2003) showed that neighborhoods with high 
rates of incarceration invited closer and more punitive police enforcement and parole 
surveillance, contributing to the growing number of repeat admissions and the resilience 
of incarceration even as crime rates fall.  They included measures of both prison and jail 
admissions, emphasizing how even short term incarceration in local facilities contributed 
to further incarceration. Using growth curve models and controlling for the endogeneity 
of crime, incarceration and social structural disadvantage, they concluded that 
incarceration produced more incarceration net of crime, and that incarceration was 
associated with increasing crime.  The engine for the growth in incarceration was drug 
enforcement, which continued to resupply incarceration (Fagan, West and Holland, 2003, 
2005). These dynamics spiraled over time in a reciprocal dynamic that at some tipping 
point is likely to reach equilibrium.  The dynamic becomes self-sustaining and 
reinforcing, and continues even as externalities such as labor market dynamics or 
population structure undergo significant change, as well as in the face of declining crime 
rates and receding drug epidemics.   
In the second study, based on data from a two-wave study neighborhoods in 
Tallahassee, Florida, Clear et al. (2003) showed a positive relationship between the rate 
of releases one year and the community’s crime rates the following year.  They showed a 
dose-response relationship between prison admissions and crime -- low rates of prison 
admissions had non-significant effects on local crime rates, moderate prison admission 
rates produced modest effects on crime, and the neighborhoods with the highest rates has 
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the strongest increase in crime.  Provocative as it may be, their study overlooked 
endogeneity of crime and incarceration that would lead to intercept differences in the 
neighborhoods at the outset of the panel and weaken the causal claim.  That is, higher 
incarceration rates may simply respond to higher crime rates, or the two may be 
spuriously related to the factors that produced these intercept differences (i.e., 
simultaneous equation bias).   
The Tallahassee study was silent on causal mechanisms, such as incarceration 
impacts on informal social control or community organization.  These mediating 
mechanisms were an explicit focus in a study by Lynch and Sabol (2004) of crime, 
incarceration and social organization in 30 Baltimore communities. Lynch and Sabol 
examined the effects of neighborhood incarceration rates on community social cohesion 
and informal social control in the 30 neighborhoods, and ultimately on crime.  They 
tested whether incarceration lessens the capacity of communities to engage in social 
control, which in turn could increase crime rates.  They identified the discretionary 
component of law enforcement – one of the primary engines of incarceration (see, also, 
Fagan et al., 2003) – through an instrumental variables model to estimate the effects of 
law enforcement (arrest) on incarceration net of crime.5  They showed that incarceration 
rates reduced feelings of community solidarity, and undermined neighborhood residents’ 
willingness to join in the types of neighborhood activities that are critical elements of 
collective actions to reduce crime.  At the same time, incarceration seemed to promote 
informal social control, a neighborhood benefit that can produce an effective response to 
crime.6  Their results leave complicated lessons, though perhaps these lessons could be 
unraveled by sorting out the effects on communities with different baselines of collective 
action and crime. 
                                                  
5 That is, they computed the portion of the rate of drug arrests in each neighborhood that was not explained 
by the index crime rate 
6 The positive effect of incarceration on informal social control may, at first glance, be unexpected.  Lynch 
and Sabol suggest that changes (increases) in incarceration rates encourage informal social control through 
mechanisms such as fear reduction.  Because they failed to find that incarceration promotes interactions 
with residents, they suggest that the incarceration/informal social control linkage operates through 
individuals: “Residents may see or know of persons being incarcerated for crime, and this may increase 
their confidence in engaging in informal social control. They may feel that the “bad guys” are gone and that 
the criminal justice system is working with them to increase safety” (Lynch and Sabol, 2004:24). 
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The common ground in both studies is the indictment of incarceration as a 
negative influence on community organization and informal social control, a perverse 
consequence that may produce more and not less crime.  Rose and Clear (1998) 
hypothesized that concentrations of incarceration may disrupt social networks by 
damaging familial, economic, and political sources of informal social control, mortgaging 
the community’s social capital and also the social ties of the persons living there 
(regardless of whether they had been to prison).   In their 2003 study, Clear et al. identify 
the mechanism for the erosion of social cohesion and social capital (also noted by Lynch 
and Sabol) as coercive mobility.  This is a dynamic process of residential mobility that is 
induced by high rates of removal to and return from prison.  Such mobility has long been 
implicated in higher crimes in communities (c.f., Shaw and McKay, 1943), but more 
recent updates of this theory pinpoint the mechanisms by which mobility raises the risk of 
crime (see, for example, Bursik, 1988; Fagan and Davies, 2004).  Rose and Clear suggest 
that coercive mobility undermines the less coercive and more influential institutions of 
social control, such as families, community associations, and a community’s capacity to 
enforce norms to defend against crime (see, for example, Bursik and Grasmick, 1993).  
These dynamics are compounded systemically by the mobility of citizens who are victims 
of crime,7 citizens who might otherwise be participants in social regulation.  Thus, the 
churning effects of prisoners coming and going with limited job prospects every time 
they return may contribute systemically to the mobility that increases the risks of crime.  
High rates of incarceration may reduce incentives for citizens to participate in 
informal social control by reducing the communicative value of sanctions, de-
legitimizing law and legal actors, further inviting crime and intensifying the crime-
enforcement-incarceration-crime cycle (Fagan and Meares, 2003; Uggen and Manza, 
2004).  High rates of imprisonment raise questions of the legitimacy of government and 
undermine incentives to comply with the law (Sherman, 1993 Tyler and Huo, 2002).  The 
racial and neighborhood asymmetry in punishment offers a stark contrast to the claims of 
legal actors that law is fair and legitimate.  If local residents reject the claim that prison 
                                                  
7 See, for example, Laura Dugan and Robert Apel  (2002) on the coerced mobility of women who flee from 
violent relationships with intimate partners. 
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sentences are fairly distributed across races and neighborhoods, they may conclude that 
the policy the produces the unfair distribution is illegitimate (Fagan, 2004).  
 
Incarceration and Neighborhood Economic Well-Being 
Much of what we know about the adverse effects of incarceration on individuals’ 
prospects in the legal labor market come from large and small panel studies of former 
inmates. We were unable to locate studies of the effects of incarceration on the aggregate 
social or economic well-being of neighborhoods as a function of the rates of removal to 
prison or jail.  
The panel studies agree that the prospects for stable employment and future 
earnings of former inmates are dim (Freeman, 1992; Fagan and Freeman, 1999; Western 
and Pettit, 2000; Western, 2006).  As time spent in prison increases, the subsequent 
likelihood of disengagement from the legal economy increases (Freeman, 1996; Grogger, 
1995; Hagan, 1991).  Once out of prison, a criminal record disadvantages low-skill and 
other workers attempting either to enter the labor force or to improve their earnings 
(Pager, 2003).  Western and Beckett’s (1999) study of incarceration and unemployment 
found that although growing levels of incarceration initially produced lower rates of 
conventional measures of unemployment, the recycling of these ex-offenders back into 
the job market with reduced job prospects had the effect of increasing unemployment in 
the long run.  Western (2002) estimates that the earnings loss associated with prison 
ranges between 10 and 30 percent, and serving time in prison is also associated with 
decreased earnings growth. 
Some studies have looked at the aggregation effects of concentrated incarceration 
on labor market outcomes.  Western et al. (2001) and Western (2006) showed that 
incarceration not only lowers the work prospects of former inmates, but that the spatial 
concentration of incarceration may aggravate social and economic disadvantages by 
compounding individual barriers to meaningful employment for released prisoners and 
their peers (Western et al., 2001: 414).  These aggregate effects become a collective 
problem in neighborhoods marked by high incarceration, decreasing the prospects for 
desistance by returning inmates (Western 2001; Laub and Sampson, 2004) while 
increasing crime risks for others living in the same areas.  
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Incarceration potentially stigmatizes neighborhoods, complicating the ability of 
local residents to access job hiring networks to enter and compete in labor markets 
(Granovetter, 1973, 1974), and deterring businesses from locating in those areas 
(Granovetter, 1974).  The stigma evidently is not lost on employers.  Holzer, Raphael and 
Stoll (2004) show that employers are more reluctant to hire former prisoners than welfare 
recipients.  Both welfare recipients and inmates are spatially concentrated in poor 
minority neighborhoods, so the imbalance in employer preferences is even more striking.  
Thus, job scarcity, even for low-skill jobs, will likely add to the concentration of 
economic disadvantage in neighborhoods that already lag behind others in employment 
and earnings. 
In their Baltimore study, Sabol and Lynch (2003) examined labor force 
participation using releases from prison as a proxy for incarceration rates. Using race-
specific models, they show found that release rates were positively and significantly 
related to unemployment for blacks but the opposite was the case for whites.  Disruption 
of these local networks of social control and economic activity can mean that the long run 
consequences of incarceration will be to increase crime (Lynch and Sabol, 2004).  The 
secondary effects of incarceration are diffused to others in neighborhoods with spatially 
concentrated incarceration.  Low earnings and employment by returning prisoners burden 
families since former inmates have less ability to bring money to families, and less to 
spend on essential services in their communities.   
Lynch and Sabol (2004:273) argue that “[incarceration] can also reduce the 
earning power of family left behind because they must tend to tasks formerly performed 
by the incarcerated family member.  In the long run, incarceration will have negative 
effects on the economic life of the community by reducing the ability of returning 
inmates to obtain jobs and higher salaries.”  This prediction is reinforced when we 
consider the employer preferences shown by Holzer and colleagues. 
 
Incarceration and Family Integrity 
 
One would expect incarceration to be a turning point in the lives of men in several 
ways that increases their crime risks.  Not only are they disadvantaged in the worklplace, 
but their ties to their children and families suffer, eroding an essential form of emotional 
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and social support that has strong effects on criminal activity (Sampson and Laub, 1993; 
Laub and Sampson, 2004). Recent studies offer evidence that imprisonment damages the 
ties between incarcerated men and women, their families, and their communities (Hagan 
and Dinovitzer, 1999:122; Geller et al., 2012). These effects further burden the efforts of 
former inmates to avoid crime once back in their communities, but also their capacity to 
supervise and raise children.  
Researchers have focused on the fates of families and children, with inferences 
about communities based on the concentration of incarceration and the aggregation of 
individual effects.  In Random Family, LeBlanc (2003) reports on a social and familial 
network of Latino families and neighbors. Her ethnography showed how incarceration 
can weaken families by removing men from existing families, by reducing the supply of 
marriageable men in the neighborhood, and in turn attenuating or skewing family 
formation toward unstable couplings (LeBlanc, 2003; see also Wilson, 1996).  Her work 
shows the effects of incarceration on the capacities of families as socializing agents for 
children, and less able to supervise teenage children.  
Edin, Nelson and Paranal (2004) show that incarceration influences the ties 
between imprisoned men and their children in several ways.  In life history studies with 
men with low job skills in two cities, they identify a group of men whose ties to their 
children – ties that were strong prior to incarceration -- were disrupted by their 
imprisonment.  Fathers in this group were less able to supervise their children and 
maintain parental ties that important to preventing children’s involvement with the law 
(Geller et al., forthcoming).  For some men, incarceration disrupted the destructive 
behaviors that had weakened their ties to their children in the years before prison.  For 
this group, prison offered the chance for a different kind of turning point.  For others, 
having children provided an incentive to avoid crime and raised the costs of crime and 
legal trouble.  But incarceration also disrupted the economic role of those men whose 
criminal activities were an important income source for their children and partners.  For 
these men, incarceration not only strained family ties but also family economic well 
being. Fatherhood increased the pressures to provide materially for their children, not just 
with strollers and playpens when they are younger, but for clothes and shoes when they 
become children and adolescents. Yet the workplace stigma of incarceration kept many 
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of these men out of even low wage legal work and contributed to their return to crime 
(Edin et al., 2004). 
Several studies show that children of incarcerated parents have poorer emotional, 
behavioral and psychological development than other children ( Wildeman, 2010; Murray 
et al., 2009; see, Johnson and Waldfogel, 2002, for a review of earlier work). Even when 
parent behaviors prior to incarceration have had negative influences on child 
development before an incarceration event, these studies show that the effects of 
incarceration are also observed once the parent leaves home for prison.  One pathway to 
adverse child development is through removal to foster care.  Children with an 
incarcerated parent are more likely to be placed in foster care where developmental 
outcomes are uncertain, and the disruption of parental attachment can have serious 
developmental consequences (Johnson and Waldfogel, 2004; Geller et al. forthcoming).   
These effects fall more heavily on non-white families, and especially on African 
American families.  Myers (2000) argues that the high rates of incarceration of African 
American males contribute to the higher prevalence of black families headed by single 
women in predominantly African American neighborhoods.  Lynch and Sabol (2003) 
estimate that increases in incarceration of black men were associated with about 20% of 
the increase in the number of black families headed by single women during the 1980s.  
And when men go to prison in high rates in poor minority neighborhoods, the supply of 
marriageable men declines, suppressing the marriage rate.  As Wilson (1996:104) 
explains, “both inner-city black males and females believe that since most marriages will 
eventually break up and since marriages no longer represent meaningful relationships, it 
is better to avoid the entanglements of wedlock altogether.”   
When women go to jail or prison, the children of African American incarcerated 
mothers are far more likely to be placed with another family member or in foster care 
compared to white women, even after controlling for differences in social position 
(Johnson and Waldfogel, 2004: 123). One consequence, then, of higher incarceration 
rates is strain on the child welfare system.  The spatial concentration of incarceration will 
focus these systemic strains in small social areas with limited foster care resources and 
supervisory or regulatory capacities.   
Incarceration and Local Social Control 
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Recent work with incarcerated males and the “fragile families” they leave behind 
suggests that incarceration disrupts family ties and social networks, aggravating 
vulnerabilities to crime through compromises to social control, in turn creating a 
churning effect on social networks (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994; McLanahan and 
Bumpass, 1998; Geller XXXXX).  Social organization and social control are spatially 
embedded processes that influence neighborhood-level variations in violence (Morenoff 
et al., 2001).  Thus, rising and concentrated rates of incarceration not only become a part 
of the fabric of poor communities, already susceptible to crime, but they compromise the 
limited forms of social control that poor communities can mount.  
Informal social control is essential in the regulation of crime (Grasmick and 
Bursik, 1993).  But social control is intricately tied to social structure, supporting citizen 
activities – social regulation – that can sustain or inhibit crime (Sampson et al., 1997).  
When economic conditions are weak, the strains of everyday life can compromise the 
participation of local residents in social regulation. Thus, rising and concentrated rates of 
incarceration not only become a part of the fabric of poor communities, already 
susceptible to crime, but they compromise the limited forms of social control that poor 
communities can mount.  If these effects extend to neighborhood economic well-being, 
the strains on residents’ capacity for social control reinforce the crime-incarceration 




The negative consequences of concentrated incarceration in poor neighborhoods 
may offset its public safety benefits (Fagan et al., 2003).  The cascade of negative 
consequences may corrode the ecological dynamics of neighborhood social control, in a 
way that actually may elevate crime risks over time (Lynch and Sabol, 2004; Clear et al., 
2003; Fagan et al., 2005). Here, we reverse the question, and estimate the effects of 
incarceration on neighborhood economic fortunes as part of the influence of incarceration 
on the ecology of social control. We suspect that higher incarceration is associated with 
lower income and less human capital at the tract level.  
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We suggest that the spatial concentration of incarceration can influence attenuate 
a neighborhood’s economic fortunes through three possible mechanisms (Fagan et al., 
2003): (1) incarceration complicates the efforts of individuals to forge links to legal work 
(Hagan and Palloni, 1990; Fagan and Freeman, 1999; Pager, 2002; Holzer et al., 2004); 
(2) concentrated incarceration compromises social control in multiple ways by increasing 
the number of single-parent households, reducing the number of older males, and by 
straining citizens’ relationships to law and social control (Lynch and Sabol, 2004; Myers, 
2000); and (3) the concentration of incarceration in poor, predominantly minority 
communities can also lead to voter disenfranchisement which may adversely affect the 
political economy of neighborhoods (Maurer, 1999; Uggen and Manza, 2002; Uggen, 
Manza and Behrens, 2003).  In addition, high rates of incarceration may mark a 
neighborhood as risky or high crime, and attract recurring and intensive police attention 
that sustains the elevated risks of police action. 
With these mechanisms in mind, we present analyses on the effects of 
incarceration on the economic fortunes of neighborhoods.  First, we present trends in 
incarceration and crime for New York City census tracts for the period from 1985-1996, 
the most recent era of sharp increases in incarceration in New York City and State (Fagan 
et al., 2003).  Next, we show the effects of incarceration on two indicia of neighborhood 
economic well-being: median household income and human capital in a series of 
regression models that take advantage of the panel structure of the data.  We include jail 
populations in addition to prison populations, a dimension of incarceration that has been 
neglected in much of the research on incarceration.  We use the homicide victimization 
rate as a proxy for the overall crime rate (see: Maltz, 1998).  We include a series of 
control variables that capture the dimensions of neighborhood social control and social 
structure, and that themselves are bound up with both incarceration and crime.  To 
estimate temporal effects, we include interactions of time with each of these predictors.  
 
III.  RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS 
 
 
Crime and Incarceration in New York City 
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 Trends in crime and incarceration in New York City from 1985-97 provide the 
backdrop for understanding how incarceration shapes the economic fortunes of 
neighborhoods.  Crime rates rose in New York beginning in 1985 concurrent with the 
onset of the crack epidemic and the emergence of street drug markets that themselves 
were flashpoints for violence and other crimes (Fagan et al., 1998; Karmen, 2000; 
Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006).  Table 1 shows that violent crime rose 29.1% from 1985-
90, and the total index crime (i.e., major felonies) rate rose by 18.0%.  Starting in 1991, 
crime fell sharply, by nearly 50% for index crimes and 46.7% for violent crimes. 
 Incarceration rates rose and fell concurrently with changes in crime rates, though 
the trajectories were quite different.  Prison sentences rose 89.0% from 1985 to 1990, 
rising more quickly than the crime rates.8  Prison sentences then declined by 19.2% 
through 1997, a rate slower than the decline in crime.  The steadily increasing rates of 
prison sentences per reported crime, arrest and conviction – during periods of both 
increase and decline in crime -- showed the change in the rise in the propensity for 
incarceration within the criminal justice system in New York City.  The effect of these 
changes in punishment norms was sharp and sustained growth in New York State’s 
prison population. The state prison population rose from 25,000 in 1985 to 55,000 in 
1990 and then to nearly 70,000 in 1997 (Fagan et al., 2003).9  Most – about 70% -- of the 
state’s inmates come from New York City.   
 The jail population grew more slowly than did the prison population after 1985, 
but continued to grow as prison populations declined in the 1990s. The City’s average 
                                                  
8 Over the past decade, New York City has experienced a steady decline in crime rates that ranks among the 
largest decreases of any American city.  The total number of homicides dropped from a record high of 
2,262 in 1990 to 606 in 1998—the lowest homicide count since 1964.  As the number of homicides 
declined steadily, other serious crime was also dropping, but not at the same rate.  From 1990 to 1995, 
reported index crimes declined by nearly 40%, from 711,556 to 442,532.  Within two more years, index 
crimes dropped further to 356,573, an overall decline of nearly 50% from its peak in 1990.  Overall, the 
total number of index crimes in New York City dropped by fifty percent between 1990 and 1997 and 
violent crimes dropped by forty-seven percent (Fagan, West and Holland, 2003).  However, felony arrests 
dropped by only twelve percent, and misdemeanor arrests increased by seventy-three percent in the same 
period, despite the dramatic decrease in overall crime numbers. 
9 In 1987, 75% of all NYS prison admissions originated from cases disposed in New York City, 69% in 
1990, and 69% in 1994. NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and National Corrections 
Reporting Program (NCRP).  
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daily jail inmate population was 17,897 in 1999, a small decline from the 1990 
population of 19,643 when crime rates were twice as high (Piquero et al., 2005).10   
 The engine for the growth and stability of incarceration – in the face of declining 
crime rates – is aggressive enforcement of drug laws, especially street-level enforcement 
resulting in large numbers of felony arrests of retail drug sellers (Fagan et al., 2003).  
Aggressive street enforcement and drug enforcement programs such as Operation 
Pressure Point, the Tactical Narcotics Teams, the Street Crimes Unit, and Operation 
Condor produced consistent high rates of felony drug arrests since the mid-1980s (see, 
for example, Letwin, 1990; Herman, 199_; Sviridoff et al., 1992; Belenko and Fagan, 
1993; Greene, 1999; Rashbaum, 2000; Fagan and Davies, 2000; Ketham, 2002)   Despite 
the dramatic decreases in crime in New York City, drug-related arrests continued to 
increase each year through the late 1990s.11  For most of the 1990’s, drug-related offenses 
accounted for an increasing proportion of New York State prison admissions: from just 
12% of all New York State prison admissions in 1985, to 31% in 1990, to 38% in 1996.12  
Because these inmates are likely to serve long sentences under New York’s “predicate 
felony” laws, drug offenders comprised a growing proportion of the city’s and state’s 
incarcerated population (Fagan et al., 2003). 
 
Data 
To estimate the effects of incarceration on neighborhood economic fortunes, we 
used a longitudinal panel of incarceration, crime, enforcement and social structure in 
New York City census tracts for the period from 1985 to 1997 (Fagan et al., 2003).  We 
obtained a twenty-five percent sample of all individuals sentenced to prison and a five 
                                                  
10 New York City Department of Correction (DOC).  On-line data report: 
http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doc/html/avrdaily.html. 
11 From 1990 to 1997, misdemeanor drug arrests in NYC were steadily increasing—accounting for twenty-
seven percent of all misdemeanor arrests in 1990 to thirty-one percent in 1997.  During the same period, 
felony drug arrests remained relatively stable—accounting for approximately thirty two  percent of all 
felony arrests.  New York State, Division of Criminal Justice Services, Criminal Justice Indicators By 
Percent Change New York City: 1990-1997, 
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/areastat/areast.htm (last visited May 30, 2003). 
12 United States Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Corrections Reporting Program, 
1985, 1990, and 1996: United States [computer file].  Conducted by U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census.  ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
[producer and distributor]. 
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percent sample of all jail sentences for cases with dispositions in New York City for the 
years 1985, 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996.  This yielded an annual sample of prison 
sentences of 2,000 to 4,000 individuals, and an annual sample of jail sentences of 3,000 
to 4,000 individuals.  Records of persons admitted to prisons or jails were geocoded by 
residential address of the incarcerated person.  Geocoded cases and crime counts were 
aggregated to each census tract.  Rates of crime and incarceration were then computed for 
each census tract. 
We used homicide victimization rates as a proxy of crime generally (Maltz, 1998, 
1999), and to account both for base rates of the supply of individuals available for 
incarceration, and the endogeneity of crime with incarceration and neighborhood social 
organization (Morenoff et al., 2001; Fagan and Davies, 2004).  Unfortunately, the New 
York City Police Department does not make available crime data for geographically 
precise areas such as neighborhoods or census tracts. 13  Instead, we used data on 
homicide victimization from the Office of Vital Statistics of the New York City 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Deaths are recorded by the Office of the 
Medical Examiner after classifying injuries as either intentional, accidental or self-
inflicted.  Neighborhood rates were estimated by aggregating from individual cases that 
were geocoded to the census tract using residential address of the victim, and using a 
population denominator for each year in the time series.14 
To address the specific and theoretically significant contribution of drug 
enforcement on incarceration, we constructed a time series on drug arrests as a measure 
of the intensity of drug enforcement and as a proxy for the locations and intensity of drug 
                                                  
13  Beginning in 1994, the New York City Police Department launched a computerized crime mapping 
system, COMPSTAT (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).  Crime data before 1994 cannot be located to specific 
addresses other than through manual geocoding of complaint and arrest records, or manual coding of the 
records of arrestees.  Even after the launch of COMPSTAT, these data were unavailable for research 
purposes, but were used internally for strategic analysis of enforcement practices.  One reason is that the 
spatial coordinates were obtained only for the initial crime complaint, which often was unverified at the 
time it was incorporated into the database.  NYPD officials were reluctant to release these data, since many 
of the complaints had not been investigated.  For example, a complaint of a gunshot might turn out on 
investigation to be a car backfiring.  Or a burglary could simply be a missing personal item that was later 
recovered.  Once verified, complaints were entered into the city’s crime counts, but for unstated reasons, 
the geographical coordinates of the crime location were not carried forward or aggregated. 
14 Although using residential address in lieu of  event location may distort the spatial estimates for violent 
events, we based this decision on prior work showing the close proximity of homicide events to the 
residences of victims. See, for example, Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998; Fagan, 1999. 
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markets (Baumer et al., 1998; Ousey and Lee, 2002).  This time series was created by 
obtaining a ten percent sample of drug arrests from 1985-97 from the New York State 
Division of Criminal Justice Services (see, Fagan and Davies, 1992).  Each arrest record 
was geocoded to the residential address of the arrestee and then assigned to each type of 
spatial unit. We aggregated arrests for drug possession, drug sales, and possession with 
intent to sell into a single measure of drug arrest as a measure of overall police 
aggressiveness in drug enforcement that was independent of the changing enforcement 
priorities that influenced the separate indicia over time. 
 Data on human capital, household income, and other measures of neighborhood 
social organization were obtained from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 census files (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Summery Tape File 3A). Census tracts equivalencies were 
developed to adjust for changes in census tract configuration the three Census iterations. 
Data for between census years were linearly interpolated.     
 
Measures 
Neighborhood economic well-being is measured along two dimensions: median 
household income and human capital.  Human capital is an index of three items, derived 
from principal components factor analysis of educational attainment (percent high school 
graduates), labor force participation (weeks worked by persons16 and over in past year), 
and job skills (percent 16 and over with skilled occupation) (see, Fagan et al., 2003).  
These are indicia of work experience and labor market skills that tend to increase 
earnings (e.g., Becker, 1991), and are consistent with earlier indicia of human capital 
(e.g., Sanders and Nee, 1996).  We used a Z-score for median household income, rather 
than applying  uncertain cost-of-living or inflation estimators to this measure, we 
preferred to use the standardized measure that aligns each observation with other 
observations (tracts) in the panel in a consistent metric over time and overcomes 
differences in the skew and variance within each panel.  
We used propensity scores of incarceration to identify the “treatment effects” of 
incarceration on neighborhood economic status.  Propensity scores are commonly used to 
adjust for biases resulting from the non-random allocation of subjects to treatment 
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exposures (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 2002).  In this case, incarceration 
is not randomly allocated across the city’s census tracts, and the “dosages” of 
incarceration similarly reflect non-random differences in crime, social structure and law 
enforcement across (Fagan and West, 2003).  In this case, propensity scores for both 
prison and jail are the estimated probability of the allocation of the “treatment” to each 
neighborhood.  Propensity scores thus control for the endogeneity of crime, social 
structure and law enforcement, as well as other unobserved confounding variables.  We 
used separate equations to estimate jail and prison propensity scores for each tract in each 
year of the panel.   
Following Rubin (1997), we used a set of theoretical predictors to estimate the 
propensity scores that differed from those used to test the primary research questions.  
This allows for greater flexibility in model specification than the typical adjustments in 
regression-based model estimation techniques, and more effectively reduces biases 
resulting from confounding among predictors that is a recurring problem with 
observational data (Rosenbaum, 2002). Ideally, we would want the functional form of the 
propensity score analysis to be determined by the data, but in this case, the extreme skew 
in incarceration rates by tract dictated that we use a log transformation and a linear 
model.  
Accordingly, we estimated ordinary least squares regressions for logged jail and 
prison rates, with predictors including homicide, drug arrests, and a series of social 
structural factors that are well-identified in criminological research on crime and 
punishment (c.f., Land et al., 1990; see, Fagan and Davies, 2004, for a review).  
Following Land et al. (1990), we sorted 18 tract-level variables along seven dimensions – 
poverty, labor market, segregation, supervision, anonymity, immigration, and housing 
structure – that characterize the dimensions of concentrated disadvantage articulated in 
the theoretical and empirical literature linking neighborhood effects with indicia of social 
adversity and isolation including crime (see, for example, Sampson et al., 2002; Bursik 
and Grasmick, 1993). For each census year, we used principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation to construct a factor score for each dimension.  Appendix A shows the 
item loads and factor scores for each dimension for 1990.  We imputed factor scores for 
the between-census years to construct a score for each year. 
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 From the regression models, we generated the predicted value for jail and prison 
rates for each period to estimate the effects of incarceration on neighborhood economic 
status over time.  The results are not shown, but are available from the authors.  The 
explained variance in each model exceeds .60, a sign that a large fraction of the 
explanatory power of incarceration is attributable to other factors that are associated with 
incarceration, and better isolates the effects of incarceration by removing the effects of 
potentially confounding variables.  
 To estimate the effects of concentrated prison incarceration, census tracts were 
sorted for each year into quartiles.  First, for each year, we included all tracts with no 
incarceration events in a “no event” group.  The remaining tracts were sorted into 
quartiles.15  We also computed the percentage of population for African Americans and 
non-white Hispanics in each tract in each year.  Alternate specifications of the estimation 
models included these measures to examine race-specific effects, and also to control for 
the demographic concentration of incarceration in New York City within these two 
minority populations (Fagan et al., 2003). 
 
Analysis  
We estimated growth curve models using random effects regression methods16 to 
examine incarceration effects on neighborhoods (Little et al., 1996; Singer, 1998; 
Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Singer and Willett, 2003).  We included the propensity 
scores for incarceration, with controls for the homicide rate (lagged one year and logged), 
the drug arrest rate (lagged one year and logged), the population over age 15 (logged), 
and the social control factor.  Models were estimated with random intercepts. We 
emphasize social control because of its central role in theoretical and empirical work on 
the effects of incarceration on communities (Grasmick and Bursik, 1993; Rose and Clear, 
1998; Lynch and Sabol, 2004).  As shown in Appendix A, this measure is a factor score 
                                                  
15 We estimated models with dummies for the two highest quartiles as “high incarceration” tracts, and with 
the top quartile as “very high incarceration.”  Models were estimated substituting these indicia of prison for 
the actual prison rates.  The results were robust to these specifications. 
16  Separate models were estimated with either fixed and random effects, and a Hausman test was employed 
to test for the choice between the two kinds of models.  Models with fixed versus random effects produced 
similar results though coefficients varied in magnitude but not significance. 
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that combines the concentration of youth population, the percent of female-headed 




where Yit is economic measure of each census tract i for each time period t, Yi is the mean 
of Y over time for each tract, and X is a vector including the incarceration propensity 
scores and other predictors. 
We include time as both a fixed and random effect: time is included as a random 
effect to account for the panel structure of the data, and as a fixed effect to account for 
the specific year within the panel. We include an interaction term of time by each 
predictor to estimate their specific longitudinal effects.  In this form, the main effect 
represents the average effect of the predictor across the time series, and the interaction 
with time as the longitudinal effect.  We focus on the latter to identify the cumulative 
longitudinal effects of incarceration. 
 
IV.  RESULTS 
Patterns and Trends 
 Figures 1 and 2 show the concentration of prison admissions and their relationship 
to income and human capital in New York City neighborhoods.  Figures 1a and 1b 
compare prison admissions by median household income for two periods: 1985-90 and 
1993-96, periods of increasing and then declining crime in New York City; Figures 2a 
and 2b similarly compare incarceration with human capital.  The patterns show the strong 
inverse correlation for each economic indicator with the rate of prison admissions: prison 
admissions are concentrated in neighborhoods with the lowest incomes and the lowest 
human capital.  The figures also show the stability of incarceration by neighborhood 
during two distinctly different crime eras.  Despite strong crime declines in New York 
City, prison admissions were concentrated in the same neighborhoods. 
 Figures 3 and 4 and Tables 2 and 3 show change over time in household income 
and human capital using quartiles to group neighborhoods according to their 
 22 
concentration of prison incarceration.  The patterns for jail quartiles are similar (data not 
shown). The unadjusted median household income rose over the study period in each of 
the quartiles plus the no-incarceration group, however there is less fluctuation when the 
values for income are standardized.  Figure 3 shows the adjusted median household 
income (Z-scores) over time and Table 2 show the general trend in income unadjusted for 
inflation.  Over the panel, neighborhoods with the highest incarceration have the lowest 
median household income. Although there is some fluctuation between the two highest 
and lowest household income, the neighborhoods with highest incarceration rates had 
lower household incomes over time. The concentration seems, at first glance, to be stable 
in the face of changing externalities such as declining homicide rates and changing 
property values.  In neighborhoods with no incarceration events, the adjusted median 
income appears flat.  As expected, the rise in household income was greater in the 
neighborhoods with no incarceration and slowest in the areas with the highest rates of 
prison admissions.   There are slight difference in between the observed pattern in the the 
two highest and lowest quartiles.  But these differences in slope appear to be marginal.   
 The temporal patterns for human capital were less consistent across quartiles.  As 
with household income, none of the lines cross, indicating stability in the relative position 
of neighborhoods over time in the distribution of human capital across the city that seems 
invariant to changes in crime rates or other economic or social externalities.  Table 3 and 
Figure 4 show a slight increase in human capital through 1991 for the neighborhoods 
with no incarceration, and then a slight decline.  For the first quartile, those 
neighborhoods with the lowest incarceration rates, human capital remained stable across 
over time.  In the second and third quartiles, human capital increased through 1991 before 
declining slightly through 1997.  The trend in the fourth quartile differed: human capital 
rose slightly before declining sharply and then rising slightly again in the last period in 
the study interval. 
Incarceration Effects: Model Estimation 
 
 Models were estimated in four ways to more specifically identify the effects of 
both jail and prison on neighborhood economic status.  Models for jail and prison were 
estimated separately.  Models with both jail and prison were then estimated to examine 
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their additive effects on economic measures.  The fourth model examined their 
conditional effects by including an interaction term that combined jail and prison 
admissions.  We included race-specific measures of neighborhood demography.  Each set 
of models included first-order interactions of each predictor with time to examine the 
effects over time of incarceration and the other predictors.17   Descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the models are shown in Table 4. 
 
 Incarceration Effects on Household Income 
 
 Table 5 shows incarceration effects across four model specifications for 
neighborhood (median) household income.  In these, we pay attention both to the direct 
effect of incarceration and the interactions between the incarceration “treatment” and 
time. Incarceration in general, but jail more specifically, has an economically 
destabilizing effect on neighborhoods.   When estimated separately prison and jail have 
significant negative effects  on  communities’ economic fortunes: higher rates of all 
forms of incarceration depress household incomes.  When estimated together, jail 
continues to decrease a neighborhood’s household income, but prison, while still 
negative, fails to reach significance. The positive interaction terms between time and 
incarceration suggest that overtime these negative effects are significantly amplified.   
In the first three models, there are no significant effects for blacks. Higher 
percentages of Hispanics, however, are associated with lower household income, and the 
effects increase over time.  The effect of race sustains separately from its contributions 
through the propensity score estimations for jail and prison, perhaps owing to the scale of 
race effects on neighborhood economic status relative to highly variable incarceration 
rates by census tract.   
In the conditional model, the coefficients for jail and prison are still negative and 
significant the interaction term is positive and significant.  However, there is little change 
in the explanatory power of the additive and conditional models. There is no change in 
the R2 between the jail only model and the additive model and only a very modest gain in 
                                                  
17 Alternate specifications included race-specific incarceration measures, and models that included a 
dummy for whether the neighborhood was in the highest quintile of incarceration rates to identify whether 
effects were concentrated at the extremes of the distribution of jail or prison rates.  The results were 
unchanged. 
 24 
explained variance in the conditional model.  In these data, then, there is little evidence of 
interactions between jail and prison: the effects appear to be neither conditional nor 
interdependent, nor are they additive in their effects on neighborhood incomes. 
 The opposing effects of jail and prison are not surprising as a matter of crime 
control and neighborhood ecology.  Admissions to jail and prison are processes that occur 
concurrently though perhaps sustained by distinct patterns of policing and enforcement.  
In New York, jail admissions result from enforcement of quality of life crimes and low-
level misdemeanors, consistent with order maintenance policing strategies (Harcourt, 
2001; Greene, 1999), whereas drug enforcement and other anti-crime activities are more 
likely to produce prison-generating felony arrests (Fagan et al., 2003).  Nevertheless, the 
models estimating the propensity scores suggest that the two incarceration processes are 
concentrated in similar if not identical neighborhoods.  In fact, their bivariate correlation 
averaged over the study interval is .914.  Including both prison and jail in the same model 
(Table 5, columns 3 and 4) may conceptually more accurately capture the dynamics of 
incarceration within neighborhoods than is portrayed by separate models, but the 
coefficients are almost indistinguishable from other specifications., The additive and 
conditional models produce similar results, and in both estimations, the effects for jail 
and prison each decrease a community’s economic outlook.  
  
 Incarceration Effects on Human Capital 
 The effects of prison and jail admissions on human capital follow a similar  
pattern.  The main effects of prison and jail models (Table 6, column 1 and 2) are 
significant and negative. However, neither jail nor prison is significant in the additive and 
conditional models.  We see that the effects of incarceration for both the jail and prison 
models are amplified over time.   Again, combining measures of incarceration have no 
additional explanatory power.  There are positive and significant race effects for the 
proportion of the population that is black.  This is distinct from the result predicting 
household income, where the influence of the proportion of the population that is black 
was negative, but failed to reach statistical significance.  Rather than suppressing human 
capital, when incarceration is controlled for, tracts with a higher proportion of the 
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population that is black had more human capital.  However, this effect is diminished over 
time.  The proportion of the population that is Hispanic is not significantly associated 
with human capital.     
V.  DISCUSSION 
Recent work on the collateral effects of incarceration has focused on the fortunes 
of individuals returning from prison, and on the social and psychological well-being of 
those left behind.  Only a few studies have attended to the collective fates of 
neighborhoods with elevated incarceration rates, and most of these projects have 
examined how incarceration patterns contribute to the endogenous and spiraling 
relationship between crime and incarceration.  Given its unique and heavy individual 
costs, the emphasis in incarceration research has been primarily on prisons, with little 
attention to frequent though shorter-term stays in local jails.  Here, we address each of 
these dimensions of research on incarceration. 
 
Loosely Coupled Enforcement 
 
We find distinct, yet, consistent, effects for prisons and jails, suggesting that these 
separate processes based on loosely coupled law enforcement priorities and penal 
strategies have a distinct impact on communities in New York City.  Heterogeneous 
policing regimes in New York City created separate streams of prisoners eligible for 
prison and jail.  During much of the study period, prison populations were driven by 
street drug enforcement aimed at low-level dealers (Fagan et al., 2003; Sviridoff et al., 
1992; Jacobson, 2005).  This enforcement strategy was carried out by elite police units 
such as the Tactical Narcotics Teams, known locally as TNT (Sviridoff et al., 1992; 
Fagan, 1994: Kleiman, 1992). TNT units were assigned to broad areas of the City rather 
than specific precincts.  They made tens of thousands of felony drug arrests each year 
beginning in 1988 and continuing through 1992, heavily populating prisons with felony 
drug offenders, changing the offense composition of prisons (Letwin, 1990; Herman, 
1999; Fagan et al., 2003).  But jail populations were driven by enforcement of 
misdemeanor laws, including lesser drug crimes and local enforcement of incivilities and 
minor drug crimes. Uniformed patrol officers assigned to precincts, without the 
organizational attention or status that was conferred on the specialized street drug details, 
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were the front lines in this less visible but persistent enforcement strategy.    However, it 
would seem that the jail removals have had the more profound and lasting impact on 
communities.  
Only for the last of the waves in this panel – 1996 – had New York’s Order 
Maintenance Policing been implemented, which switched the priorities from felony drug 
enforcement to enforcement of a variety of forms of low-level disorder crimes, including 
tens of thousands of misdemeanor marijuana arrests (Maple and Mitchell, 2000).  But the 
enforcement dichotomy remained.  Like TNT, the elite Street Crime Unit under OMP 
searched for guns and violent offenders, while uniformed patrol officers emphasized 
misdemeanor arrests (Spitzer, 1999; Fagan et al., 2010).   
So, even after the onset of OMP strategies, we still see the notion of loosely 
coupled police regimes producing different arrest streams that influenced jail and prison 
populations separately.  While the Street Crime Unit concentrated its efforts in high crime 
areas, predominantly poor neighborhoods with higher crime rates and concentrations of 
non-white residents, lower level enforcement of disorder was a citywide campaign that – 
although skewed somewhat toward poor areas – affected residents of neighborhoods 
across the City.  Race seems work differently for different communities of color. After 
controlling for prison and jail removals the size of the black population does not 
significantly influence the income outcome of communities, but the Hispanic population 
does. It is possible that there are a number of ecological forces at work, including 
enforcement strategies that disproportionately targeted Hispanic communities.    Race 
effects are different for human capital than for income.  The Hispanic population is not 
related to a communities human capital, but the black population is in unanticipated way.  
 
Two Kinds of Poverty Traps 
 
Incarceration effects are more pronounced for household income than human 
capital, suggesting perhaps different ecological explanations and policy pathways.  The 
negative effects of imprisonment rates on aggregate household income are illustrative of 
the complex but systemic relationship between persistent poverty, crime and 
incarceration. Jail and prison have lasting effects on incomes which persist over time.  
Incarceration in prison seems to give rise not only to more imprisonment (Fagan et al., 
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2003), but also to lower incomes. Jail serves not only as a pathway to prison, but a 
profound destabilizing influence on communities.   The reinforcing spiral of poverty, 
crime and incarceration describes what Sampson and Morenoff (2006) characterize as a 
poverty trap (see, also, Fagan 2008).  High rates of neighborhood imprisonment can have 
multiple effects that sustain the downward pressure on local incomes: tainting non-
offender residents who seek jobs as crime risks, burdening returning inmates with 
reduced prospects in the workplace, and reducing the attractiveness of such 
neighborhoods for economic or housing investments. 
The effect of jail on incomes is suggestive of the increasing reliance on the use of 
jail as an enforcement strategy across the City’s residential neighborhoods. Places with 
high jail rates are characterized if not by high rates of low-level crime, then by at least 
low-level social disorder of the kind that attracts law enforcement attention and a kind of 
enforcement that removes people for short, but disruptive periods. The repetitive high 
rates of removal to jail of low-level offenders from poor communities followed by their 
quick release creates a churning effect on neighborhoods that destabilizes social control 
and instills a sense of chaos and disorder more typical of a pristine version of broken 
windows theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Cole, 1996; Livingston, 1997; 
Maple and Mitchell, 2000; Waldeck, 2000; Harcourt, 2001). Also, jail populations often 
are socially and psychologically troubled, and their interrupted presence in struggling 
communities is unlikely to aid the efforts of residents in those areas to develop 
economically or become socially cohesive (Jacobson, 2005).  They too have dim 
prospects in the workplace, but their diffusion across neighborhoods dilutes their 
concentrated effects on local incomes.   
Race effects on income work in unanticipated ways and require further analyses.  
While prison and jail are concentrated in predominately poor and segregated 
communities, once incarceration factored out of the equation difference in the  
proportions of African Americans was not related to incomes, but there was a lasting 
negative influence on neighborhood fortunes.  We observed greater for neighborhoods 
with higher proportions of Hispanics.  Hispanics not only have a wider income 
distribution than African Americans in New York City, but they also tend to live in less 
segregated areas (Kasinitz et al., 2008).  Immigrants in New York are now a higher share 
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of Hispanic neighborhoods and populations than other ethnic groups, and their spatial 
spread and economic diversity may explain at least some of the story in this differential.  
Beyond these factors, more research is needed to further decompose the crime, 
incarceration and economic conditions of Hispanics. 
Human capital effects are less sensitive to incarceration effects than are 
incarceration effects on incomes. Human capital, including both workplace activity and 
educational capital, may be more sensitive to education policy than to incarceration or 
crime policy, and that may explain the narrow effects of incarceration on human capital.  
Both educational status and workplace experience are components of our measure of 
human capital, and the effects of incarceration may be unequal for these separate 
dimensions.  High rates of imprisonment or jail removal will deplete the workplace 
prospects both of those who have gone to prison or jail as well as their neighbors.  Again, 
the effects are direct as well indirect through adverse forms of neighbor network effects, 
as neighborhood stigma affects both former prisoners and others in high incarceration 
places. Not only are those removed to jail or prison likely to have low educational 
attainment, but they also are unlikely to find remedial services in overcrowded and 




Spatially targeted policies such as microinvestment and housing development 
may be needed offset the local embeddedness of poverty and disrupt its connections to 
incarceration and crime.  New York experienced a housing boom in the years after this 
study period, and that boom is concurrent with further crime declines (Fagan and Davies, 
2007; Schwartz et al., 2003).  At the same time that residential real estate rose in value, 
so too did the value of commercial real estate, suggesting the emergence of sustainable 
small businesses in the neighborhoods with high crime and incarceration rates.  The fact 
that crime fell more rapidly and steeply in these places may reflect these factors, beyond 
any regression effects.  Policies that encourage these forms of economic development can 
offset or surpass the negative effects of imprisonment, while education policy and 
transitional labor market networking can strengthen local human capital. 
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Human capital may also be sensitive to these types of economic development 
policies, as well as to education and crime control policies.  One connection may be in 
the use of Order Maintenance policing strategies in schools that result in high rates of 
suspension and expulsion for both violations of school rules and low-level crimes.  The 
public safety benefits of such a strategy are tempered by the risk of attenuated 
educational capital for older adolescents and young adults attempting to enter the 
workforce.  While microinvestment may provide work opportunities, the attenuation of 
educational capital in poor neighborhoods may offset these chances and block access to 
these new workplaces.  And the deterioration of education and training programs in 
prisons – and their non-existence in jails – may further compound the human capital 
deficits of those going to and returning from spells of incarceration.  While these two 
policy options can leverage local resources to offset the adverse effects of incarceration, 
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Table 1. Crime and Punishment, New York City, 1985-1997 
       
  1985 1990 1995 1997   
% Change 
1985-1990   
% Change 
1985-1997   
% Change  
1990-1997 
Reported Crime           
Total Index Crimes 602,945 711,556 442,532 356,573  18.0   (40.9)  (49.9) 
Violent Crimes 135,305 174,689 114,180 92,866  29.1   (31.4)  (46.8) 
% Violent Crimes 22.4 24.6 25.9 26  9.8   16.1   5.7  
                      
Sentences 
    Total 75,264 92,261 79,845 93,141  22.6   23.8   1.0  
    Prison 10,802 20,420 18,353 16,490  89.0   52.7   (19.2) 
    Jail 61,839 66,035 55,957 71,508  6.8   15.6   8.3  
    Jail + Probation 2,623 5,806 5,535 5,143  121.3   96.1   (11.4) 
                      
Incarceration Rates           
Prison Sentences per 100 
Index Crimes 1.79 2.86 4.15 4.62  59.8   158.1   61.5  
 
Prison Sentences per 100 
Felony Prosecutions 35.5 37.2 42.9 44.5  4.8   25.4   19.6  
 
Prison Sentences per 100 
Convictions 7.2 12.8 10.5 8.8  77.8   22.2   (31.3) 
 
Jail Sentences per 100 
Misdemeanor Arrests 50.7 60.6 33.9 37.4   19.5    (26.2)   (38.3) 
           
 





Figure 1a. and 1b. Prison Admissions and Median Household Income by Census Tract, New York City 
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Figure 2a. and 2b. Prison Admissions and Human Capital by Census Tract, New York City 
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Table 2.  Median Household Income by Incarceration Quartiles, 1986-





Quintile 1986   1988   1991   1994   1997 
No Events 28,523   32,740   38,354   41,890   44,039 
 (10535)   (12241)  (14320)  (16197)  (16568) 
           
1 24,022   28,917   34,389   36,720   40,047 
 (8195)   (10597)  (12733)  (12280)  (17943) 
           
2 21,706   25,186   31,171   33,250   34,654 
 (8961)   (10888)  (10946)  (11361)  (12197) 
           
3 17,709   21,058   24,704   26,162   28,715 
 (8095)   (9550)  (10776)  (10988)  (13908) 
           
4 14,832   17,621   18,790   20,066   22,198 
 (7373)   (8977)  (10715)  (9816)  (14212) 
           
 
Total 24,675   27,972   32,218   35,012   37,821 
  (10815)   (12527)   (14584)   (15854)   (17526) 
                    




Table 3.  Human Capital (Factor Score) by Incarceration 
Quartiles, 1986-97, New York City Census Tracts (Means, 
Standard Deviations) 
          Year         
Quintile 1986   1988   1991   1994   1997 
0.261   0.283   0.316   0.335   0.302 No 
Events  (0.854)  (0.870)  (0.841)   (0.800)   (0.826) 
                   
1 0.288   0.317   0.409   0.334   0.253 
  (0.931)   (0.868)  (0.898)  (0.893)  (0.933) 
             
2 -0.143   -0.096   0.051   0.037   -0.063 
  (0.896)   (0.921)  (0.786)  (0.845)  (0.861) 
             
3 -0.583   -0.485   -0.432   -0.483   -0.477 
  (0.875)   (0.869)  (0.918)  (0.859)  (0.918) 
              
4 -0.940   -0.870   -1.049   -1.053   -0.958 
  (0.840)   (0.929)   (0.844)   (0.796)   (0.881) 
             
Total 0.001   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
  (0.966)   (0.978)   (0.987)   (0.964)   (0.968) 
                    





Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 Mean Std. Dev.       Minimum     Maximum 
Median Household Income 31,541 15,208 4,757 177,088 
Population > 15      3018 2361 16 34079 
Percent African American 26.2     32.1 0.0    100.0 
Percent Non-White Hispanic 22.6 21.9 0.0 100.0 
Prison Rate* 2.4 4.3        0.0   114.1 
Jail Rate* 7.9 18.2 0.0  421.1 
Drug Arrest Rate*  9.6 19.9       0.0    619.8 
Homicide Victimization Rate† 0.24     0.36   0.0 6.5 
Poverty/Inequality (Factor)  0.0     1.0 -3.1 3.1 
Human Capital (Factor) 0.0 1.0 -5.1 3.0 
Segregation (Factor) 0.0 1.0   -2.8 1.7 
Social Control (Factor) 0.0 1.0   -5.2   4.9 
Anonymity (Factor)  0.0 1.0 -3.4  8.9 
Immigration (Factor) 0.0 1.0 -1.8 4.5 
Housing Structure (Factor) 0.0 1.0 -3.4 13.7 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*  Rate per 10,000 persons 




Table 5.  Random Effects Regression of Jail and Prison on Median 
Household Income (Z-score) by Census Tract, 1986-97 (Coefficients, p(z)) 
 Prison Jail Additive Conditional 
 Only Only Effects Effects 
 
Main Effects 
    
   Prison (propensity) -.448***     -.121    -.360*** 
   Jail (propensity)  -.224*** -.188*** -.276*** 
   Interaction      .065*** 
   % Black     -.078        -.057     -.005     .332*** 
   % Hispanic -1.037*** -.949*** -.918*** -.517*** 
     
Effects Over Time     
   Prison (propensity)  .036***       .026   .058* 
   Jail (propensity)  .014*** .011** .007 
   Interaction         -.000 
   % Black    -.036***     -.024***    -.029***      -.036*** 
   % Hispanic     .008 .015** .012** .001 
     
     
Model Statistics     
   R2 .648 .662 .662 .688 
   χ2 (Wald) 3595.10 3694.45 3749.04 4742.71 
   p (χ2) .000 .000 .000 .000 
   Rho hjih    .928 .928 .926 .911 
     
All models include random effects for time, population size, social control, human capital, drug 
arrest rate (logged), homicide rate (logged). All models estimated with random intercepts and 
robust standard errors 
 




Table 6.  Random Effects Regression of Jail and Prison on Human Capital 
by Census Tract, 1986-97 (Coefficients, p(t)) 
 Prison Jail Additive Conditional 
 Only Only Effects Effects 
 
Main Effects 
    
   Prison (propensity)    -.116*    -.002    -.092 
   Jail (propensity)     -.055*   -.058    -.070 
   Interaction       -.026 
   % Black   .657*** .656*** .668*** .708*** 
   % Hispanic    -.168        -.156   -.154    -.121 
     
Effects Over Time     
   Prison (propensity)     .026*      -.008      .028 
   Jail (propensity)  .004*      .006 .012** 
   Interaction        -.006** 
   % Black  -.028***  -.028*** -.026*** -.038*** 
   % Hispanic -.032*** -.032*** -.030***  -.042*** 
     
     
Model Statistics     
  R2 .732 .732 .733 .736 
  χ2(Wald) 3123.05 3023.45 3392.95 3683.06 
   p (χ2) .000 .000 .000 .000 
   Rho .892 .896 .886 .884 
All models estimated with fixed effects for time, population size, social control, drug arrest rate 
(lagged, logged), homicide rate (lagged, logged). All models estimated with random intercepts. 
 
p(t) :  *** p<.001 , ** p < .01,  * p < .05 
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Appendix A.  Neighborhood Factor Composition, 1990 
Rotated Eigenvalue % Explained  
Coefficient Variance         
 
Poverty/Inequality  2.20 73.29 
%Households with Public Assistance Income  0.97 
%Households with Income Below Poverty 0.95 
Gini for Total Household Income 0.61 
 
Labor Market/Human Capital I  3.14 78.43 
%College Grads-Persons 25 and Over 0.88 
%Labor Force Participation-Persons 16 and Over 0.88 
Employment Rate-Persons 16 and Over 0.92 
Skilled Occupation-Persons 16 and Over 0.86 
 
Segregation  1.51 75.62 
Racial Fragmentation Index 0.87 
% Nonwhite 0.87  
 
Social Control I -Supervision  2.34 77.88 
% Youth Population (5-15) 0.94 
% Female Headed Households with Children <18 0.85 
Supervision Ratio (25-64 | 5-24)       -0.86 
 
Social Control II –Anonymity  1.04 52.16 
Population-1990 0.72 
Residential Mobility-Same House as 1985 0.72 
 
Immigration and Cultural Isolation  1.64 81.86 
Foreign Born 0.91 
Linguistic Isolation 0.91 
 
Housing Structure  1.61 80.61 
% Rental Housing 0.90  
Housing Density (persons per room) 0.90 
 
 
